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Abstract. We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by introduc-
ing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph G = (N,E), with an
integer vertex capacity function b and an edge weighting w. The set N consists
of a number of players that are to form a set M ⊆ E of 2-player coalitions ij
with value w(ij), such that each player i is in at most b(i) coalitions. A payoff
vector is a mapping p : N ×N → R with p(i, j) + p(j, i) = w(ij) if ij ∈M and
p(i, j) = p(j, i) = 0 if ij /∈ M . The pair (M,p) is called a solution. A pair of
players i, j with ij ∈ E \M blocks a solution (M,p) if i, j can form, possibly
only after withdrawing from one of their existing 2-player coalitions, a new
2-player coalition in which they are mutually better off. A solution is stable if
it has no blocking pairs. Our contribution is as follows:
– We survey, for the first time, known results on stable solutions in seven
basic models and show that our model of multiple partners matching games
is the natural model that was missing so far.
– We give a polynomial-time algorithm that either finds that a given mul-
tiple partners matching game has no stable solution, or obtains a stable
solution for it. Previously this result was only known for multiple part-
ners assignment games, which correspond to the case where G is bipartite
(Sotomayor, 1992) and for the case where b ≡ 1 (Biro´ et al., 2012).
– We characterize the set of stable solutions of a multiple partners matching
game in two different ways and show how this leads to simple proofs for
a number of known results of Sotomayor (1992,1999,2007) for multiple
partners assignment games and to generalizations of some of these results
to multiple partners matching games.
– We perform a study on the core of the corresponding cooperative game,
where coalitions of any size may be formed. In particular we show that
the standard relation between the existence of a stable solution and the
non-emptiness of the core, which holds in the other models with payments,
is no longer valid for our (most general) model. We also prove that the
problem of deciding if an allocation belongs to the core jumps from being
polynomial-time solvable for b ≤ 2 to NP-complete for b ≡ 3.
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1 Introduction
Consider a group of soccer teams participating in a series of friendly games with each
other off-season. Suppose each team has some specific target number of games it wants
to play. For logistic reasons, not every two teams can play against each other. Each
game brings in some revenue, which is to be shared by the two teams involved. The
revenue of a game may depend on several factors, such as the popularity of the two
teams involved or the soccer stadium in which the game is played. In particular, at
the time when the schedule for these games is prepared, the expected gain may well
depend on future outcomes in the current season (which are in general difficult to
predict [28]). In this paper, we assume for simplicity that the revenues are known. Is
it possible to construct a stable fixture of games, that is, a schedule such that there
exist no two unmatched teams that are better off by playing against each other? Note
that if teams decide to play against each other, they may first need to cancel one of
their other games in order not to exceed their targets.
The above example describes the problem introduced in this paper (see Section 4
for another example). In the next section we explain how we model this problem.
1.1 Our Model
We model the above example in two settings, namely as a matching problem and as a
cooperative game. As we will show these two settings are deeply interwoven.
Matching Problem. A multiple partners matching game is a triple (G, b, w), where
G = (N,E) is a finite undirected graph on n vertices and m edges with no loops and
no multiple edges, b : N → Z+ is a vertex capacity function, which is a nonnegative
integer function, and w : E → R+ is a nonnegative edge weighting. The set N is
called the player set. There exists an edge ij ∈ E if and only if players i, j can form a
2-player coalition. A set M ⊆ E is a b-matching if every player i is incident to at most
b(i) edges of M . So, a b-matching is a set of 2-player coalitions, in which no player is
involved in more 2-player coalitions than described by her capacity. If ij ∈ M then i
and j are matched by M ; we also say that i and j are partners under M . The value of
a 2-player coalition i, j with ij ∈ E is given by w(ij).
A nonnegative function p : N × N → R+ is a payoff vector with respect to a
b-matching M if the following two conditions hold:
• p(i, j) + p(j, i) = w(ij) for all ij ∈M ;
• p(i, j) = p(j, i) = 0 for all ij /∈M .
In that case we also say that M and p are compatible.1 Note that p prescribes how the
value w(ij) of a 2-player coalition {i, j} is distributed amongst i and j, ensuring that
non-coalitions between two players yield a zero payoff. A pair (M,p), where M is a
b-matching and p is a payoff compatible with M , is a solution for (G, b, w). We view p
as a vector with entries p(i, j), which we call payoffs.
Let (M,p) be a solution. Two players i, j with ij ∈ E \M may decide to form
a new 2-player coalition if they are “better off”, even if one or both of them must
first leave an existing 2-player coalition in M (in order not to exceed their individual
capacity). To describe this formally we define a utility function up : N → R+, related
to a payoff vector p. If i is saturated by M , that is, if i is incident with b(i) edges in M ,
then we let up(i) = min{p(i, j) : ij ∈ M} be the worst payoff p(i, j) of any 2-player
1 Assume that b and w are strictly positive functions. If p and M are compatible, then p is
not compatible with any other b-matching, that is, p uniquely determines M . However, for
our purposes it is more convenient to follow the literature and define p with respect to M .
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coalition i is involved in. Otherwise, i is unsaturated by M and we define up(i) = 0.
Alternatively, we could define up(i) as the b(i)th largest payoff p(i, j) to i. Note that
the second definition shows that utilities are independent of M and determined by p
only (recall1 that this is because p in fact determines M).
A pair i, j with ij ∈ E \M blocks (M,p) if up(i) + up(j) < w(ij). We say that
(M,p) is stable if it has no blocking pairs, or equivalently, if every edge ij ∈ E \M
satisfies the stability condition, that is, if
up(i) + up(j) ≥ w(ij) for all ij ∈ E \M.
Note that the stability condition only needs to be verified for edges not in M .
Remark 1. Let (G, b, w) be a multiple partners matching game with b ≡ 1. Then any
b-matching is a 1-matching, i.e, a matching, as for each i ∈ N , we have p(i, j) > 0 for
at most one player j 6= i, which must be matched to i. In that case we will sometimes
assume, with slight abuse of notation, that p is a nonnegative function defined on N .
Then we can write up(i) = p(i) for every i ∈ N . Checking whether a pair (M,p) is
a solution for (G, 1, w) comes down to verifying whether p(i) + p(j) = w(ij) holds
for every edge ij ∈ M . Checking whether a solution (M,p) is stable comes down to
verifying whether p(i) + p(j) ≥ w(ij) holds for every edge ij ∈ E \M .
We can now define our problem formally:
Stable Fixture with Payments(SFP)
Instance: a multiple partners matching game (G, b, w)
Question: does (G, b, w) have a stable solution?
Example 1. Let G be the 4-vertex cycle u1v1u2v1u1. Let b ≡ 1 and w ≡ 1. Then G has
two maximum weight matchings, namely M = {u1v1, u2v2} and Mˆ = {u1v2, u2v1}.
Let p be given by p(u1, v1) =
7
10 , p(v1, u1) =
3
10 , p(u2, v2) =
7
10 , p(v2, u2) =
3
10 and
p(u1, v2) = p(v2, u1) = p(u2, v1) = p(v1, u2) = 0. Then p is compatible with M and
(M,p) is a stable solution for (G, 1, 1). We also observe that p is not compatible with
Mˆ . However, there exists a stable solution (Mˆ, pˆ), where pˆ can be obtained from p by
permuting the entries p(i, j) for every fixed i. Namely, let pˆ be defined as pˆ(u1, v2) =
7
10 ,
pˆ(v2, u1) =
3
10 , pˆ(u2, v1) =
7
10 , pˆ(v1, u2) =
3
10 and pˆ(u1, v1) = pˆ(v1, u1) = pˆ(u2, v2) =
pˆ(v2, u2) = 0.
Being a bit more specific than in the above example, let (M,p) and (Mˆ, pˆ) be two
stable solutions for a multiple partners matching game (G, b, w). Then we say that p
and pˆ are equivalent if the following four conditions hold:
– up(i) = upˆ(i) for every i ∈ N ,
– p(i, j) = pˆ(i, j) and p(j, i) = pˆ(j, i) for every ij ∈M ∩ Mˆ ,
– p(i, j) = up(i) = upˆ(i) and p(j, i) = up(j) = upˆ(j) for every ij ∈M \ Mˆ , and
– pˆ(i, j) = upˆ(i) = up(i) and pˆ(j, i) = upˆ(j) = up(j) for every ij ∈ Mˆ \M .
If p and pˆ are equivalent, then the multisets {p(i, j) | j ∈ N with ij ∈ E} and
{pˆ(i, j) | j ∈ N with ij ∈ E} are the same for every i ∈ N .
For a payoff vector p, the total payoff vector pt ∈ RN is defined by pt(i) =∑
j:ij∈E p(i, j) for every i ∈ N . Note that if two payoff vectors p and pˆ are equiv-
alent, then their total payoff vectors are the same, that is, pt = pˆt.2 Moreover, for
2 In fact, Sotomayor[44], calls two payoff vectors p and pˆ equivalent if pt = pˆt and the
multisets {p(i, j) | j ∈ N with ij ∈ E} and {pˆ(i, j) | j ∈ N with ij ∈ E} are the same for
every i ∈ N . Our definition implies hers and enables us to prove our results in a stronger
form. However, in the proof of her results, Sotomayer uses in fact our definition as well.
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b ≡ 1 two payoff vectors p and pˆ are equivalent if and only if pt = pˆt. We illustrate the
definition of two payoff vectors being equivalent with another example.
Example 2. Let G be the bipartite graph displayed in Figure 1 that has six vertices
u1, u2, u3, v1, v2, v3 and edges u1v1, u1v2, u1v3, u2v1, u2v2, u3v1, u3v2 and u3v3 (that
is, all edges between the two partition classes exist except u2v3). Let b(u1) = b(u2) =
b(v1) = 2 and b(u3) = b(u3) = b(v3) = 1, and define w(u1v1) = 4, w(u1v2) = 6,
w(u1v3) = 5, w(u2v1) = 4, w(u2v2) = 1, w(u3v1) = 1, w(u3v2) = 3 and w(u3v3) = 2.
Then G has two maximum weight b-matchings, namely M = {u1v1, u1v2, u2v1, u3v3}
and Mˆ = {u1v1, u1v3, u2v1, u3v2}. Let p be given by p(u1, v1) = 3, p(v1, u1) = 1,
p(u1, v2) = 3, p(v2, u1) = 3, p(u2, v1) = 2, p(v1, u2) = 2, p(u3, v3) = 0, p(v3, u3) = 2
and p(u1, v3) = p(v3, u1) = p(u2, v2) = p(v2, u2) = p(u3, v1) = p(v1, u3) = p(u3, v2) =
p(v2, u3) = 0. Then p is compatible with M and (M,p) is a stable solution for (G, b, w).
We also observe that p is not compatible with Mˆ . However, there exists a payoff
vector pˆ that is equivalent with p such that (Mˆ, pˆ) is a stable solution. Namely, let pˆ
be defined as pˆ(u1, v1) = 3, pˆ(v1, u1) = 1, pˆ(u1, v3) = 3, pˆ(v3, u1) = 2, pˆ(u2, v1) = 2,
pˆ(v1, u2) = 2, pˆ(u3, v2) = 0, pˆ(v2, u3) = 3 and pˆ(u1, v2) = pˆ(v2, u1) = pˆ(u2, v2) =
pˆ(v2, u2) = pˆ(u3, v1) = pˆ(v1, u3) = pˆ(u3, v3) = pˆ(v3, u3) = 0.
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Fig. 1. The bipartite graph G from Example 2 with the vertex capacities and edge weights.
Cooperative Game. So far, we modelled only situations in which 2-player coalitions
can be formed. Allowing coalitions of any size is a natural and well-studied setting in
the area of Cooperative Game Theory. Moreover, as we will discuss, there exist close
relationships between stable solutions and their counterpart in the second setting, the
so-called core allocations, which we define below.
A cooperative game with transferable utilities (TU-game) is a pair (N, v) consisting
of a set N of n players and a value function v : 2N → R+ with v(∅) = 0. It is
usually assumed that the grand coalition N is formed. Then the central problem is
how to allocate the total value v(N) to the individual players in N . In this context,
a payoff vector (or allocation) is a vector p ∈ RN with p(N) = v(N), where we write
p(S) =
∑
i∈S p(i) for S ⊆ N . The core of a TU-game consists of all allocations p ∈ RN
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satisfying
p(S) ≥ v(S), ∅ 6= S ⊆ N
p(N) = v(N).
(1)
A core allocation is seen as reasonable, because it offers no incentive for a subset of
players to leave the grand coalition and form a coalition on their own. However, a TU-
game may have an empty core. Hence, the most interesting computational complexity
problems (given an input game) are:
P1. Determine if the core is non-empty;
P2. Exhibit a vector in the core (provided there is any);
P3. Determine if a given p ∈ RN is in the core or find a coalition S with p(S) < v(S).
In the literature both polynomial-time and (co-)NP-hardness results are known for each
of these three problems (see e.g. [15]). An efficient algorithm for answering P3 implies
that P1 and P2 can be solved in polynomial time as well. This follows from the work of
Gro¨tschel, Lova´sz and Schrijver [21, 22] who proved, by refining the ellipsoid method
of Khachiyan [29], that an efficient algorithm for solving the separation problem for a
polyhedron P implies a polynomial-time algorithm that either finds that P is empty,
or obtains a vector of P .
We define the TU-game (N, v) that corresponds with a multiple partners matching
game (G, b, w) by setting, for every S ⊆ N ,
v(S) = w(MS) =
∑
e∈MS
w(e),
where MS is a maximum weight b-matching in the graph G[S], that is, the subgraph
of G induced by S. We define v(S) = 0 if S induces an edgeless graph. We say that
(N, v) is defined on (G, b, w) but, unless confusion is possible, we may also call (N, v)
a multiple partners matching game. If we say that a payoff vector p involved in a
stable solution (M,p) of SFP is a core allocation, we mean in fact that the total payoff
vector pt is a core allocation.
Example 3. Let G be the 4-vertex cycle v1v2v3v4v1. Define a vertex capacity function b
by b(v1) = b(v2) = 1 and b(v3) = b(v4) = 2, and an edge weighting w by w(v1v2) = 3
and w(v2v3) = w(v3v4) = w(v4v1) = 1. The pair (M,p) with M = {v1v2, v3v4}
and p(v1, v2) = p(v2, v1) =
3
2 , p(v3, v4) = p(v4, v3) =
1
2 and p(v2, v3) = p(v3, v2) =
p(v4, v1) = p(v1, v4) = 0 is a solution for the multiple partners matching game (G, b, w).
Note that up(v1) = up(v2) =
3
2 and up(v3) = up(v4) = 0. We find that (M,p) is even a
stable solution, because up(v2)+up(v3) =
3
2 ≥ 1 = w(v2v3) and up(v4)+up(v1) = 32 ≥
1 = w(v4v1) (note that we only need to verify the stability condition for edges outside
the matching). Moreover, the total payoff vector pt given by pt(v1) = p
t(v2) =
3
2 and
pt(v3) = p
t(v4) =
1
2 is readily seen to be a core allocation of the corresponding TU-
game. In Section 5 we will give an example of a multiple partners matching game with
no stable solutions for which the corresponding TU-game has a non-empty core.
Before stating our results for multiple partners matching games in both settings we
first discuss some existing work. As we will see, our model in both settings generalizes
(or relaxes) several well-known models.
1.2 Known Results
The first model that we discuss is the most basic model related to the famous stable
marriage problem (SM), defined as follows. Given two disjoint sets I and J of men
and women, respectively, let each player have a strict preference ordering over a subset
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of players from the opposite set. A set of marriages is a matching in the underlying
bipartite graph with partition classes I and J . Such a matching is stable if there is
no unmarried pair, who would prefer to marry each other instead of a possible other
partner. Gale and Shapley [19] proved that every instance of this problem has a stable
matching and gave a linear-time algorithm that finds one.3
The main assumptions in the basic model are
(i) monogamy: each player is matched to at most one other player (1-matching);
(ii) opposite-sex: every match is between players from I and J (bipartiteness);
(iii) no dowry: only cardinal preferences are considered (no payments).
Dropping one or more of these three conditions leads to seven other models, one of
which corresponds to our new model of multiple partner matching games, namely the
one, in which none of the three conditions (i)–(iii) is imposed. Below we briefly survey
the other six models (see also Table 1).
In the first three models that we discuss, payments are not allowed. Hence, the
notion of a (core) allocation is meaningless for these three models.
Remove (i). If we allow bigamy, that is, if we allow general b-matchings instead of only
1-matchings, we obtain the many-to-many stable matching problem, which generalizes
the stable marriage problem. The problem variant, in which we demand that b(i) =
1 for each player i ∈ I, is called the college admission problem [19], which is also
known as the many-to-one stable matching problem [39] and as the hospital/residents
problem [34]. Gale and Shapley [19] proved that every instance of the college admission
problem has a stable matching and gave a linear-time algorithm that finds one. Ba¨ıou
and Balinski [3] proved these two results for the (more general) many-to-many stable
matching problem.
Remove (ii). If we allow same-sex marriages, so the underlying graph may be an
arbitrary graph that is not necessarily bipartite, then we get the stable roommates
problem (SR), also defined by Gale and Shapley [19]. They proved that, unlike the
previously discussed models, in this model a stable matching does not always exist.
Irving [24] gave a linear-time algorithm that finds a stable matching if there exists
one.4
Remove (i) & (ii). Allowing bigamy and same-sex marriages leads to the stable fix-
tures problem (SF), which generalizes the stable roommates problem. Hence, a stable
matching does not always exist. Irving and Scott [25] gave a linear-time algorithm for
finding a stable matching (if there exists one). Cechla´rova´ and Fleiner [11] defined
the more general multiple activities problem, in which the underlying graph may have
multiple edges. They proved that even in this setting a stable matching can be found
in polynomial time (if there exists one). Moreover, they also showed that this problem
can be reduced to SR by a polynomial size graph construction.
In the remaining three models we allow payments to individual players.
Remove (iii). If we allow dowry then we obtain an assignment game, which is a multiple
partners matching game (G, b, w) where G is bipartite and b ≡ 1. In this case the SFP
problem is known as the stable marriage problem with payments (SMP). Koopmans
and Beckmann [32] proved the following result.
3 Gale and Shapley assumed that the underlying bipartite graph is complete, but in fact
their algorithm can also be used for arbitrary graphs; see [23].
4 Irving showed that a stable matching may not exist even if the underlying graph is complete.
His algorithm was designed for complete graphs, but can be used for arbitrary graphs [23].
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Theorem 1 ([32]). Every instance (G, 1, w) of SMP has a stable solution, which can
be found in polynomial time. If (M,p) is a stable solution then M is a maximum weight
matching. Moreover, for every other maximum weight matching Mˆ of G there exists
an equivalent payoff vector pˆ of p that is compatible with Mˆ .
Shapley and Shubik [42] proved that every core allocation of an assignment game
is a payoff vector in a stable solution for the corresponding instance of SMP and vice
versa. Combining their result with Theorem 1 implies that every assignment game has
a non-empty core. It is possible to obtain a stable solution in polynomial time and also
to give affirmative answers to problems P1-P3 about the core of an assignment game;
in the next paragraph we explain that this holds even if we allow same-sex marriages.
Remove (ii) & (iii). If we allow dowry and same-sex marriages then we obtain a
matching game, which is a multiple partners matching game (G, b, w) where b ≡ 1.
In this case the SFP problem is called the stable roommates problem with payments
(SRP). The following two observations are well-known [6, 17] and easy to verify.
First, a payoff vector p is a core allocation of a matching game if and only if there
exists a matching M such that (M,p) is a stable solution. Note that the core may
be empty (take a triangle with unit edge weights). Hence, a stable solution may not
always exist.
Second, for matching games, the coalitions in the system of inequalities (1) may be
restricted to 2-player coalitions. This means that problem P3, on core membership, can
be answered in linear time. As explained, a polynomial-time algorithm for P3 also leads
to polynomial-time algorithms for solving P1 and P2, about core non-emptiness, and
finding a core allocation, and thus finding a stable solution. The restriction to 2-player
coalitions even allows one to use the ellipsoid method of Khachiyan [29] directly. In a
previous paper [6], we circumvented the ellipsoid method and presented an O(nm +
n2 log n)-time algorithm that either finds that the core is empty, or obtains a core
allocation.
Remove (i) & (iii). If we allow dowry and bigamy then we obtain a multiple part-
ners assignment game, which is a multiple partners matching game (G, b, w) where
G is bipartite. In this case the SFP problem is called the multiple partners assign-
ment problem (MPA). Just as matching games, multiple partners assignment games
generalize assignment games. Sotomayor generalized Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 ([44]). Every instance (G, b, w) of MPA has a stable solution, which
can be found in polynomial time. If (M,p) is a stable solution then M is a maximum
weight b-matching and pt is a core allocation of the corresponding multiple partners
assignment game. Moreover, for every other maximum weight b-matching Mˆ of G
there exists an equivalent payoff vector pˆ of p that is compatible with Mˆ .
Theorem 2 gives affirmative answers for problems P1 and P2 for multiple partners
assignment games. The answer to P3 was still open for multiple partners assignment
games and is settled in this paper, as we will discuss in Section 1.3. We refer to Table 1
for a survey of known results and related new results that we show in this paper. In
Section 1.3 we describe all our new results.
1.3 Our Results
In Section 3, after stating some known results that we need as lemmas in Section 2, we
will prove that SFP is polynomial-time solvable. This generalizes the aforementioned
corresponding results for SRP and MPA, respectively. In particular we prove that
also for multiple partners matching games, the payoff vectors in stable solutions are
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opposite-sex same-sex allowed
(bipartite graphs) (general graphs)
monogamy no dowry SM (stable marriage) SR (stable roommates)
(1-matching) always a stable solution not always a stable solution
dowry SMP / assignment game SRP / matching game
(payments) always a stable solution not always a stable solution
core always non-empty core may be empty
bigamy no dowry many-to-many stable matching SF (stable fixtures)
allowed always a stable solution not always a stable solution
dowry MPA / mp assignment game SFP / mp matching game
always a stable solution not always a stable solution
core always non-empty core may be empty
Table 1. The eight different models; “mp” stands for “multiple partners”. The highlighted
case is the new model introduced and considered in this paper. As discussed in Section 1.2,
for all models, the results on the (non-)existence of a stable solution or core allocation were
known already or can be readily deduced from known results. Moreover, as discussed in
Section 1.2 as well, it was already known that for all models, except for the highlighted
model, a stable solution can be found in polynomial time (if it exists) and that for all the
models with payments, except for the highlighted model, a core allocation can be computed in
polynomial time (if the core is non-empty). As explained in Section 1.3, we give a polynomial-
time algorithm for finding a stable solution (if it exists) for the highlighted model. We also
prove that every stable solution corresponds to a core allocation. However, in contrast to
the correspondence between the existence of stable solutions for SRP and core allocations
for matching games, we show that there exist multiple partners matching games with a non-
empty core, while the corresponding instance of SFP has no stable solution.
always core allocations and the compatibility result of Theorem 2 for maximum weight
b-matchings of bipartite graphs can be generalized to arbitrary graphs (in fact we
generalize the whole of Theorem 2 from MPA to SFP apart from the opening claim
that every instance of MPA has a stable solution, which does not hold for SFP). Our
technique for proving all these results is based on a reduction to MPA. Moreover, we
characterize the set of stable solutions for a given instance of SFP via a reduction
to SRP. We do this via linear programming techniques that show a close relationship
between optimal solutions in the dual LP for SFP and stable solutions in the reduced
instance of SRP.
In Section 4 we illustrate the power of our characterization of the set of stable
solutions for an instance of SFP by proving that this characterization, which obviously
holds for instances of MPA as well, immediately leads to simple alternative proofs of
the three main results of Sotomayor for MPA, namely Theorem 2 of [44] (the whole
theorem) and two theorems of [45] and [46], respectively.
In Section 5 we aim to increase our understanding of the core of a multiple partners
matching game. To that end we first prove that every core allocation of a multiple
partners matchings game equals the total payoff vector of some suitable payoff vector,
which we can find in polynomial time. We then show that there exist multiple partners
matching games with a non-empty core for which the corresponding instance of SFP
has no stable solutions. Afterwards we focus on core membership, which corresponds
to problem P3. We first show that core membership is polynomial-time solvable for
multiple partner matching games defined on a triple (G, b, w) with b ≤ 2, that is, with
b(i) ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N . Due to the aforementioned result of Gro¨tschel, Lova´sz and
Schrijver [21, 22] this leads to efficient answers to P1 and P2 as well (for b ≤ 2). In our
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proof, we make a connection to the tramp steamer problem [30]. We complement this
result by showing that it is tight, namely that already for b ≡ 3 and w ≡ 1, testing core
membership is co-NP-complete even for multiple partners assignment games (whose
core is always non-empty and for which a core allocation can be found in polynomial
time due to Theorem 2).
Finally, in Section 6, we give some directions for future work.
2 Preliminaries
In order to prove our results we will need two known lemmas. The first lemma is used
in Section 3 and generalizes Theorem 1 from SMP to SRP and is implicitly used in the
literature (see, for example, [5]); we give its proof for completeness. The second lemma,
which we will use in Sections 3 and 5, is due to Letchford, Reinelt and Theis [33].
Lemma 1. If (M,p) is a stable solution for an instance (G, 1, w) of SRP, then M is
a maximum weight matching and pt is a core allocation of the corresponding matching
game. Moreover, for every other maximum weight matching Mˆ of G there exists an
equivalent payoff vector pˆ of p that is compatible with Mˆ .
Proof. Let (M,p) be a stable solution for an instance (G, 1, w) of SRP. Then the total
payoff vector pt is readily seen to be in the core of the corresponding matching game
(see also [6, 17]). Hence w(M) = pt(N) = v(N) holds, which means that M must be a
maximum weight matching.
Let Mˆ be another maximum weight matching. As pt is in the core, we find that
pti + p
t
j ≥ w(ij) for every ij ∈ Mˆ . As w(Mˆ) = v(N) = pt(N), this means that
pti + p
t
j = w(ij) for every ij ∈ Mˆ , and moreover pti = 0 if i is not incident to an edge
of Mˆ . Consequently, the vector pˆ, defined by pˆ(i, j) = pti if ij ∈ Mˆ and pˆ(i, j) = 0
otherwise, is equivalent to p and compatible with Mˆ . uunionsq
Lemma 2 ([33]). For a graph G with vertex capacity function b and edge weighting w,
it is possible to find a maximum weight b-matching of G in O(n2m log(n2/m)) time.
3 Stable Fixtures with Payments
We start with the following useful lemma. This lemma shows that a matching M in
a stable solution (M,p) for an instance (G, b, w) of SFP is always a maximum weight
b-matching. Moreover it implies that the core of a multiple partners matching game
is nonempty if the corresponding instance (G, b, w) of SFP has a stable solution (the
reverse does not hold as we will prove in Section 5).
Lemma 3. Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP. If (M,p) is a stable solution for
(G, b, w) then M is a maximum weight b-matching and pt is a core allocation of the
corresponding multiple partners matching game.
Proof. Let (M,p) be a stable solution for an instance (G, b, w) of SFP, where G =
(N,E). Before we prove that M is a maximum weight b-matching, we will first show
that pt is a core allocation of the multiple partners matching game (N, v) defined
on (G, b, w). Recall that pt is defined as pt(i) =
∑
j:ij∈E p(i, j) for every i ∈ N . Let
S ⊆ N be an arbitrary coalition, and let M ′ be a maximum weight b-matching in the
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subgraph of G induced by S. Then we have that
pt(S) =
∑
i∈S
pt(i)
=
∑
i∈S
( ∑
j:ij∈M∩M ′
p(i, j) +
∑
j:ij∈M\M ′
p(i, j)
)
=
∑
ij∈M∩M ′
(p(i, j) + p(j, i)) +
∑
i∈S
∑
j:ij∈M\M ′
p(i, j)
=
∑
ij∈M∩M ′
w(ij) +
∑
i∈S
∑
j:ij∈M\M ′
p(i, j)
≥
∑
ij∈M∩M ′
w(ij) +
∑
i∈S
∑
j:ij∈M ′\M
up(i)
=
∑
ij∈M∩M ′
w(ij) +
∑
ij∈M ′\M
(up(i) + up(j))
≥
∑
ij∈M∩M ′
w(ij) +
∑
ij∈M ′\M
w(ij) = w(M ′) = v(S).
The first inequality is valid because of the following reason. If i is unsaturated by M
then up(i) = 0 by definition. If i is saturated by M then |{j : ij ∈M \M ′}| ≥ |{j : ij ∈
M ′ \M}| and p(i, j) ≥ up(i) holds for every j 6= i by definition. The last inequality
follows from the stability condition for the pairs not matched by M . We conclude that
pt is in the core. In particular this means that w(M) =
∑
i p
t(i) = v(N). Hence, M is
a maximum weight b-matching of G. uunionsq
The remainder of the section is organized as follows. In Section 3.1 we present our
characterizations of the set of stable solutions for a given instance of SFP in terms
of stable solutions for some corresponding instance of SRP and in terms of integral
optimal solutions of some appropriate LP relaxation. In Section 3.2 we first observe
that our characterization of the set of stable solutions directly leads to a polynomial-
time algorithm for solving SFP and then we present an alternative but asymptotically
faster algorithm (in order to do so we use Lemma 2). In Section 3.3 we generalize
Lemma 1 from SRP to SFP and simultaneously Theorem 2 from MPA to SFP (apart
from one statement of Theorem 2 that we observe cannot be generalized in this way).
3.1 Characterizing Stable Solutions of SFP
In this subsection we show how stable solutions of an instance (G, b, w) of SFP corre-
spond to both stable solutions of an instance (G′, 1, w′) of SRP, where G′ is a graph
of size O(n3), and to integral optimal solutions of an LP relaxation.
Reducing to SRP. We first explain how to construct the instance (G′, 1, w′) of SRP
from an instance (G, b, w) of SFP; see also Figure 2. Our construction is based on a
well-known construction, which was introduced by Tutte [48] for nonbipartite graphs
with no edge weights. We write G′ = (N ′, E′). For each player i ∈ N with capacity b(i)
we create b(i) copies, i1, i2, . . . , ib(i) in N ′. For each edge ij ∈ E we create four players,
ij , ij , ji, ji, with edges i
sij for s = 1, . . . , b(i), ijij , ijji, jiji and jij
t for t = 1, . . . , b(j),
each with weight w(ij). This completes the construction. Note that G′ is bipartite if
and only if G is bipartite. Hence, our construction also reduces an instance of MPA to
an instance of SMP. We say that (G′, 1, w′) is reduced from (G, b, w).
Given a solution (M,p) for (G, b, w), we define a solution (M ′, p′) for (G′, 1, w′)
as follows. As b ≡ 1 in the instance (G′, 1, w′), we define p′ as a function on N ′ for
simplicity, that is, with slight abuse of notation we define p′ as a total payoff vector.
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Fig. 2. An example of the construction of an SRP instance (G′, 1, w′) from a SFP instance
(G, b, w), where b(i) = 2 and b(j) = 3.
– The payoffs of the copies will be the same as the minimum payoffs of the original
players, that is, for each i ∈ N , let p′(is) = up(i) for every s = 1, . . . , b(i).
– For each i ∈ N , we order its partners under M .
• For each ij ∈M , if j is the s-th partner of i for some s ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)}, and i is
the t-th partner of j for some t ∈ {1, . . . , b(j)} then let isij ∈M ′, ijji ∈M ′ and
jij
t ∈M ′ with the following payoffs: p′(ij) = p(i, j) and p′(ij) = w(ij)−up(i),
and similarly p′(ji) = p(j, i) and p′(ji) = w(ij)− up(j).
• For each ij ∈ E \M , let ijij , jiji ∈ M ′ with p′(ij) = min{up(i), w(ij)} and
p′(ij) = w(ij) − min{up(i), w(ij)}, and similarly p′(ji) = min{up(j), w(ij)}
and p′(ji) = w(ij)−min{up(j), w(ij)}.
We say that (M ′, p′) is reduced from (M,p) and prove in our next lemma that (M ′, p′)
is a solution for (G′, 1, w). Note that (M ′, p′) may not be the unique solution reduced
from (M,p), as it might be possible to order the partners of a player differently and
we used this order in the construction of M ′. We may also define a matching M ′ in the
above way, without defining any payoff vector p′, and say that M ′ is reduced from M .
In our next lemma we also show that our reduction preserves the “maximum weight
property” of a matching.
Lemma 4. Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP and let (G′, b′, w′) be its reduced in-
stance. Then the following two statements hold:
(i) every matching M ′ reduced from a maximum weight b-matching M is a maximum
weight matching of G′;
(ii) every pair (M ′, p′) reduced from a solution (M,p) for (G, b, w) is a solution for
(G′, 1, w).
Proof. Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP and let (G′, b′, w′) be its reduced instance.
We first prove (i) and then (ii).
(i) Let M be a maximum weight b-matching of G, and let M ′ be a matching in G′
reduced from M . Note that
w′(M ′) = 3
∑
ij∈M
w(ij) + 2
∑
ij∈E\M
w(ij) = 3w(M) + 2w(E \M) = w(M) + 2w(E).
Consider a maximum weight matching M∗ of G′. Let Eij denote all the edges in G′
that are incident with at least one vertex in {ij , ij , ji, ji}. As M∗ has maximum weight,
each Eij contains at least two edges of M
∗. By construction of G′, each Eij contains
at most three edges of M∗. If |Eij ∩M∗| = 2, then we replace the edges of Eij ∩M∗
by the edges ijij and jiji if necessary. If |Eij ∩M∗| = 3, then M∗ must contain the
edge ijji together with the edges i
sij for some s ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)} and jijt for some
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t ∈ {1, . . . , b(j)}. Hence the resulting matching Mˆ ′ is a maximum weight matching of
G′, which we can reduce from some b-matching Mˆ of G by construction. In particular,
we have that w′(Mˆ ′) = w(Mˆ) + 2w(E). As M is a maximum weight b-matching of
G, we find that w(M) ≥ w(Mˆ). Hence, we deduce that w′(Mˆ ′) = w(Mˆ) + 2w(E) ≤
w(M) + 2w(E) = w′(M ′). As Mˆ ′ is a maximum weight matching of G′, this implies
that M ′ is a maximum weight matching of G′.
(ii) Let (M,p) be a solution for (G, b, w), and let (M ′, p′) be a pair reduced from (M,p).
Every edge in G′ is obtained from an edge ij of G. We consider all cases (cf. Remark 1).
If isij ∈M ′ then p′(is)+p′(ij) = up(i)+w(ij)−up(i) = w(ij) = w′(isi¯j). If ijij ∈M ′
then p′(ij)+p′(ij) = w(ij)−min{up(i), w(ij)}+min{up(i), w(ij)} = w(ij) = w′(ijij).
If ijji ∈ M ′ then p′(ij) + p′(ji) = p(i, j) + p(j, i) = w(ij) = w′(ijji), where the one-
but-last equality follows from the assumption that (M,p) is a solution for (G, b, w).
Hence, we have shown statement (ii). uunionsq
Our next result shows that reduced solutions preserve stability. In fact, we prove a
stronger statement, as we characterize stable solutions for instances of SFP in terms
of stable solutions for instances of SRP. In particular, Theorems 3 (ii) and (iii) specify
properties of stable solutions of reduced instances that we will need later on. We note
that the restriction in statements (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 3 to maximum weight
b-matchings does not make these statements weaker due to Lemma 3.
Theorem 3. Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP and (G′, 1, w′) be the instance of
SRP reduced from (G, b, w). Then the following three statements hold:
(i) (G, b, w) has a stable solution if and only if (G′, 1, w′) has a stable solution;
(ii) (G, b, w) has a stable solution (M,p) for some maximum weight b-matching M of
G if and only if (G′, 1, w′) has a stable solution (M ′, p′), where M ′ is reduced from
M and p′(ij) = p(i, j) and p′(ji) = p(j, i) for every ij ∈M ;
(iii) a solution (M,p) for (G, b, w), where M is a maximum weight b-matching of G,
is stable if and only if every solution (M ′, p′) for (G′, 1, w′) reduced from (M,p) is
stable.
Proof. Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP and (G′, 1, w′) be the instance of SRP
reduced from (G, b, w).
We first prove the “⇒”-direction of statement (iii), namely that if (G, b, w) has a stable
solution (M,p), then every (M ′, p′) for (G′, 1, w′) that is reduced from (M,p) is stable.
Note that this immediately implies the “⇒”-direction of statements (i) and (ii) as well.
Let (M ′, p′) be reduced from (M,p). By Lemma 4 (ii) we find that (M ′, p′) is a
solution for (G′, 1, w′). We will show that (M ′, p′) is a stable solution for (G′, 1, w′).
Throughout the proof we assume that p′ is a total payoff vector defined on N ′.
In order to prove that (M ′, p′) is stable we must check whether the stability con-
dition for each edge not in M ′ is satisfied, that is, whether up′(i′) + up′(j′) ≥ w′(i′j′)
holds for all i′j′ ∈ E′ \M ′. As up′(i′) = p′(i′) for every i′ ∈ N ′, this comes down to
checking whether
p′(i′) + p′(j′) ≥ w′(i′j′) for all i′j′ ∈ E′ \M ′.
First consider each edge isij /∈ M ′. Then p′(ij) = w(ij) − min{up(i), w(ij)}. Hence
we find that p′(is) + p′(ij) = up(i) + w(ij) − min{up(i), w(ij)} ≥ w(ij) = w′(isij).
Now consider each edge ijij /∈M ′. Then p′(ij) = w(ij)−up(i) and p′(ij) = p(i, j). As
up(i) ≤ p(i, j), we obtain p′(ij) + p′(ij) = w(ij) − up(i) + p(i, j) ≥ w(ij) = w′(ijij).
Finally, consider each edge ijji /∈ M ′. Then p′(ij) = min{up(i), w(ij)} and p′(ji) =
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min{up(j), w(ij)}. If w(ij) ≤ up(i) or w(ij) ≤ up(j), then p′(ij) + p′(ji) ≥ w(ij) =
w′(ijji). Now suppose that w(ij) > up(i) and w(ij) > up(j). Then p′(ij) + p′(ji) =
up(i)+up(j) ≥ w(ij) = w′(ijji), where the inequality follows from the fact that (M,p)
is a stable solution for (G, b, w). Hence the “⇒”-directions of statements (i) and (ii)
have been proven.
We will now prove the “⇐”-directions of statements (i) and (ii). We do this as fol-
lows. First we assume that (G′, 1, w′) has a stable solution. We then show that this
stable solution can be changed into a stable solution for (G′, 1, w′) as prescribed by
statement (ii), followed by a proof of the “⇐”-direction of statement (ii).
Let (M ′′, p′′) be a stable solution for (G′, 1, w′). Let M ′ be a matching of G′ that
can be reduced from a maximum weight b-matching M of G. By Lemma 4 (i), we
find that M ′ is a maximum weight matching of G′ By Lemma 1, (G′, 1, w′) has a
stable solution (M ′, p′), where p′ is equivalent to p′′. We define p(i, j) = p′(ij) and
p(j, i) = p′(ji) for every ij ∈ M and p(i, j) = p(j, i) = 0 for every ij ∈ E \M . We
claim that (M,p) is a stable solution for (G, b, w).
First we show that (M,p) is a solution for (G, b, w). Let ij ∈ E. If ij ∈ E \M , then
p(i, j) = p(j, i) = 0 by definition of p. If ij ∈ M , then ijji ∈ M ′ by construction. As
(M ′, p′) is a solution, this means that p(i, j)+p(i, j) = p′(ij)+p′(ji) = w′(ijji) = w(ij).
Now we show that (M,p) is stable. For contradiction, assume that G has an edge
ij ∈ E \M that blocks (M,p), that is,
up(i) + up(j) < w(ij).
Note that ijji ∈ E′ \M ′ by construction. We claim that p′(ij) ≤ up(i) and p′(ji) ≤
up(j) hold. Then p
′(ij) + p′(ji) ≤ up(i) + up(j) < w(ij) = w′(ijji), which means.
together with ijji ∈ E′ \M ′, that we have obtained a contradiction with the stability
of (M ′, p′).
In order to prove that p′(ij) ≤ up(i) and p′(ji) ≤ up(j), we distinguish between
two cases. First suppose that i is not saturated by M . Then G′ contains a copy of i,
say is, that is not matched by M ′, which means that p′(is) = 0. As (M ′, p′) is stable
and isij ∈ E \M ′, we find that up′(is) + up′(ij) = p′(is) + p′(ij) ≥ w′(isij). Hence,
p′(ij) ≥ w(ij). As ijij ∈ M ′ by construction and (M ′, p′) is a solution for (G′, 1, w),
we obtain p′(ij) + p′(ij) = w′(ijij). As p′(ij) ≥ w(ij) and p′ ≥ 0, this means that
p′(ij) = 0. Hence, p′(ij) ≤ up(i).
Now suppose that i is saturated by M . Then all b(i) copies ih of i in (G′, 1, w′)
are matched by M ′. Let k be the partner of i for which p(i, k) is minimal, so up(i) =
p(i, k) = p′(ik). As isik ∈ M ′ and (M ′, p′) is a solution for (G′, 1, w′), we find that
p′(is) + p′(ik) = w(ik). From the stability of (M ′, p′) it follows that p′(ik) + p′(ik) ≥
w(ik). Hence p′(ik) ≥ p′(is) holds. From the stability of (M ′, p′) it also follows that
p′(is) ≥ w(ij) − p′(ij). As (M ′, p′) is a solution for (G′, 1, w′) and ijij ∈ M ′, we
find that w(ij) − p′(ij) = p′(ij). Putting the last three conditions together yields
p′(ij) ≤ p′(ik) = up(i), just as we claimed. We can show p′(ji) ≤ up(j) by exactly the
same arguments. Hence the two “⇐”-directions of statements (i) and (ii) have been
proven.
We are left to prove the “⇐”-direction of statement (iii). This direction can be seen
as follows. Let (M,p) be a solution for (G, b, w), where M is a maximum weight b-
matching of G. If the starting stable solution (M ′′, p′′) is reduced from a solution (M,p)
of (G, b, w) (instead of being an arbitrary stable solution for (G′, 1, w)) then the above
argument shows that (M,p) is stable. This completes the proof of the theorem. uunionsq
Note that not all stable solutions for (G′, 1, w′) can be reduced from stable solutions
for (G, b, w), as up(i) > p
′(is) is possible for some s ∈ 1 . . . b(i). This might be the case
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even for very small instances. Let G consist of only two adjacent players i and j with
b(i) = b(j) = 1 and w(ij) = 7. Then the pair (M,p) with M = {ij} and p(i, j) = 3,
p(j, i) = 4 is a stable solution, which has only one reduced solution (M ′, p′) given
by M ′ = {i1ij , ijji, jij1} and payoffs p′(i1) = 3, p′(ij) = 4, p′(ij) = 3, p′(ji) = 4,
p′(ji) = 3 and p′(j1) = 4. An alternative stable solution for (G′, 1, w′) is given by
(M ′, p′′), where p′′(i1) = 1, p′′(ij) = 6, p′′(ij) = 3, p′′(ji) = 4, p′′(ji) = 4, p′′(j1) = 3.
Remark 2. In the proof of Theorem 3 we could have used a simpler construction,
namely the one where each 4-player path in the reduced instance, ij , ij , ji, ji is replaced
with a 2-player path ij , ji. However, this reduction would not give us the one-to-one
correspondence described in Theorem 3 (ii), and this correspondence is crucial for
some of our other results.
The LP Relaxation. Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP. Let M be a matching of
G. With M we associate a binary vector xM : E → {0, 1} called the characteristic
function of M , which is defined by xM (ij) = 1 for all ij ∈ M and xM (ij) = 0 for all
ij ∈ E \M . Then we can write ∑j:ij∈E xM (ij) ≤ b(i) for each i ∈ N as an alternative
way to state the capacity condition. This leads to the following LP relaxation, which
we call Primal-(G, b, w):
max
∑
ij∈E
w(ij)x(ij) (P-obj)
subject to
∑
j:ij∈E
x(ij) ≤ b(i) for each i ∈ N, (a)
0 ≤ x(ij) ≤ 1 for each ij ∈ E. (b)
We make the following observation.
Lemma 5. The (optimal) solutions of the integer linear program corresponding to
Primal-(G, b, w) correspond to the (maximum weight) b-matchings of G and vice versa.
We now formulate the dual LP Dual-(G, b, w) of Primal-(G, b, w):
min
∑
i∈N
b(i)y(i) +
∑
ij∈E
d(ij) (D-obj)
subject to y(i) + y(j) + d(ij) ≥ w(ij) for each ij ∈ E, (a’)
0 ≤ y(i) for all i ∈ N, (b’)
0 ≤ d(ij) for all ij ∈ E. (c’)
Note that for an optimal dual solution (y, d), it holds that d(ij) = [w(ij)−y(i)−y(j)]+
(where the latter notation means max{w(ij)− y(i)− y(j), 0}).
We now characterize stable solutions of instances of SFP in terms of integral optimal
solutions of Primal-(G, b, w).
Theorem 4. An instance (G, b, w) of SFP has a stable solution if and only if the LP
Primal-(G, b, w) has an integral optimal solution.
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Proof. Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP. By Theorem 3 (i) it suffices to show that
the instance (G′, 1, w′) of SRP reduced from SFP has a stable solution if and only if
Primal-(G, b, w) has an integral optimal solution. We show this below. 5
(⇒) Suppose that (M ′′, p′′) is a stable solution for (G′, 1, w′), where we again assume
that p′′ is a total payoff vector (defined on N ′). Let M ′ be a maximum weight matching
of G′ that can be reduced from a maximum weight b-matching M of G. By Lemma 1,
(G′, 1, w′) has a stable solution (M ′, p′), where p′ is equivalent to p′′.
Before we define a feasible solution (y, d) of Dual-(G, b, w), we will first show that
p′(is) = p′(it) for every player i ∈ N and every two indices s, t ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)}. For con-
tradiction, suppose that p′(is) > p′(ir) for some i ∈ N and indices r, s ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)}.
Then, as p′(ir) ≥ 0, we have that p′(is) > 0. This means that isij ∈ M ′ for some
j ∈ N \ {i}, which implies that p′(is) + p′(ij) = w′(isij) = w(ij). Consequently,
p′(ir) + p′(ij) < p′(is) + p′(ij) = w(ij) = w′(irij), thus irij would block (M ′, p′). This
contradicts the fact that (M ′, p′) is a stable solution for (G′, 1, w). Hence we may set
y(i) = p′(is) for every copy is of every i ∈ N, (2)
as this is well-defined. We also define
d(ij) = [w(ij)− y(i)− y(j)]+ for every ij ∈ E. (3)
In this way we have obtained our feasible solution (y, d) of Dual-(G, b, w).
We define an integral solution x of Primal-(G, b, w) as follows. For each ij ∈ E, let
x(ij) = 1 if ijji ∈ M ′ and x(ij) = 0 otherwise. Recall that isij ∈ M ′ for exactly one
index s ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)} if and only if ijji ∈M ′. Hence, as each is is incident to at most
one edge of M ′, we find that
∑
j:ij∈E x(ij) =
∑
j:ijji∈M ′ 1 ≤ b(i). As 0 ≤ x(ij) ≤ 1
for every ij ∈ E, we find that x is a feasible solution.
It remains to prove that x is an optimal solution of Primal-(G, b, w). In fact we will
show that x and (y, d) are both optimal, as they satisfy the complementary slackness
conditions:
– For every i ∈ N , if ∑j:ij∈E x(ij) < b(i) then (as isij ∈ M ′ for exactly one index
s ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)} if and only if ijji ∈ M ′) some copy of i, say ir, is unmatched in
M ′. Therefore y(i) = p′(ir) = 0. This means that dual condition (b’) is binding.
– For every ij ∈ E, if x(ij) < 1, then x(ij) = 0 and thus ijji /∈ M ′ . Then, by
construction of M ′, we have that isij /∈ M ′ for any s ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)}, ijij ∈ M ′,
jiji ∈ M ′ and jijt /∈ M ′ for any t ∈ {1, . . . , b(j)}. These facts, together with
the stability conditions for isij and jij
t and the fact that y(i) = p′(is) holds by
definition, imply that
y(i) + p′(ij) = p′(is) + p′(ij) ≥ w′(isij) = w(ij) = w(ijij) = p′(ij) + p′(ij),
and thus y(i) ≥ p′(ij), and similarly, y(j) ≥ p′(ji), which means that y(i) +y(j) ≥
p′(ij) + p′(ji) ≥ w′(ijji) = w(ij), where the second inequality is implied by the
stability condition for ijji. As a consequence, d(ij) = [w(ij) − y(i) − y(j)]+ = 0
holds. This means that dual condition (c’) is binding.
– For every ij ∈ E, if x(ij) > 0, then x(ij) = 1 and thus ijji ∈M ′ and therefore, by
construction of M ′, we have that isij ∈ M ′ for some s ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)}, ijij /∈ M ′,
jiji /∈ M ′ and jijt ∈ M ′ for some t ∈ {1, . . . , b(j)}. These facts, together with
5 Note that we could have proven Theorem 4 directly, without reducing to an instance of
SRP. However, as a byproduct of our proof we obtain an alternative description of the set
of stable solutions of the reduced instance (Corollary 1), which we think is worth noting.
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the stability conditions for ijij and jiji and the fact that y(i) = p
′(is) holds by
definition, imply that
y(i) + p′(ij) = p′(is) + p′(ij) = w′(isij) = w(ij) = w(ijij) ≤ p′(ij) + p′(ij),
and thus y(i) ≤ p′(ij), and similarly, y(j) ≤ p′(ji), which means that y(i) +y(j) ≤
p′(ij)+p′(ji) = w′(ijji) = w(ij); as a consequence, d(ij) = [w(ij)−y(i)−y(j)]+ =
w(ij)− y(i)− y(j) holds. This means that dual condition (a’) is binding.
Hence x is an integral optimal solution of Primal-(G, b, w), as required.
(⇐) Let x be an integral optimal solution for Primal-(G, b, w) and let (y, d) be an
optimal solution of Dual-(G, b, w). From x and (y, d) we create a stable solution (M ′, p′)
for (G′, 1, w′) as follows.
As x is an integral optimal solution, x is a characteristic function of some maximum
weight b-matching M by Lemma 5. Let M ′ be a maximum weight matching in G′
reduced from M . For every i ∈ N , let p′(is) = y(i) for each s ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)}. For each
ij /∈ M we define p′(ij) = y(i) and p′(ij) = w(ij) − y(i). For each ij ∈ M we choose
ξ(i, j) ≥ 0 and ξ(j, i) ≥ 0 with ξ(i, j) + ξ(j, i) = d(ij) and define p′(ij) = y(i) + ξ(i, j)
and p′(ij) = w(ij)− y(i).
We will first show that (M ′, p′) is a solution for (G′, 1, w′), that is, p′(i′) + p′(j′) =
w′(i′j′) for every i′j′ ∈ M ′. Suppose ij ∈ M . Then isij ∈ M ′ for some s = 1, . . . , b(i)
and jtji ∈ M ′ for some t = 1, . . . , b(j). By symmetry, we only need to consider the
edge isij . We find that p
′(is) +p′(ij) = y(i) +w(ij)− y(i) = w(ij) = w′(isij). We also
have ijji ∈M ′ and find that
p′(ij) + p′(ji) = y(i) + ξ(i, j) + y(j) + ξ(j, i) = y(i) + y(j) + d(ij) = w(ij) = w′(ijji),
where the one-but-last equality follows from the fact that dual condition (a’) is binding
for ij ∈M , as x(ij) = 1 > 0.
Now suppose ij /∈ M . Then ijij ∈ M ′ and jiji ∈ M ′. By symmetry we only need
to consider the edge ijij . We find that p
′(ij) + p′(ij) = w(ij)− y(i) + y(i) = w(ij) =
w′(ijij). Hence, p′(i′)+p′(j′) = w′(i′j′) for every i′j′ ∈M ′, which means that (M ′, p′)
is a solution for (G′, 1, w′).
Now we show that (M ′, p′) is stable, that is, we show that p′(i′) + p′(j′) ≥ w′(i′j′)
for every i′j′ ∈ E′\M ′. First suppose ij ∈M . Then ijij ∈ E′\M ′ and p′(ij)+p′(ij) =
w(ij) − y(i) + y(i) = w(ij) = w′(ijij), as required. We also have jiji ∈ E′ \M ′ and
can show that the stability condition is satisfied for jiji in the same way.
Now suppose ij ∈ E \M . Then ijji ∈ E′\M ′. As x(ij) = 0 < 1, dual condition (c’)
is binding for ij, so d(ij) = 0. Consequently, we deduce that
p′(ij) + p′(ji) = y(i) + y(j) = y(i) + y(j) + d(ij) ≥ w(ij) = w′(ijji),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that (y, d) is a solution of Dual-(G, b, w).
We also have isij /∈ E′ \M ′ for s = 1, . . . , b(i) and jtji /∈ E′ \M ′ for t = 1, . . . , b(j).
By symmetry it suffices to consider an edge isij for some s ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)}. Then we
obtain p′(is) + p′(ij) = y(i) + w(ij) − y(i) = w(ij) = w′(isij). We conclude that the
stability condition is satisfied for every i′j′ ∈ E′ \M ′. This completes our proof. uunionsq
The following corollary is obtained directly from the proof of Theorem 4. It gives
a full description of the set of stable solutions of every instance of SFP that is reduced
from some instance of SRP. In particular, this explains why this set may contain
stable solutions that cannot be reduced from stable solutions for (G, b, w) (recall that
we gave an explicit example of such a stable solution in the paragraph after the proof
of Theorem 3).
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Corollary 1. Let (G′, 1, w′) be an instance of SRP reduced from an instance (G, b, w)
of SFP that has a stable solution. Then (G′, 1, w′) has a stable solution (M ′, p′) if and
only if Dual-(G, b, w) has an optimal solution (y, d) with y(i) = p′(is) for every i ∈ N
and s ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)} (and d(ij) = [w(ij)− y(i)− y(j)]+ for every ij ∈ E).
Proof. Let (G′, 1, w′) be an instance of SRP reduced from an instance (G, b, w) of SFP
that has a stable solution.
(⇒) Suppose that (G′, 1, w′) has a stable solution (M ′, p′). Then Dual-(G, b, w) has
an optimal solution (y, d) with y(i) = p′(is) for every i ∈ N and s ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)} and
d(ij) = [w(ij) − y(i) − y(j)]+ for every ij ∈ E due to equations (2) and (3) in the
proof of Theorem 4.
(⇐) Suppose that Dual-(G, b, w) has an optimal solution (y, d) with y(i) = p′(is) for
every i ∈ N and s ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)}. Recall that the equalities d(ij) = [w(ij) − y(i) −
y(j)]+ (ij ∈ E) follow directly from the optimality of (y, d). As (G, b, w) has a stable
solution, Theorem 4 tells us that Primal-(G, b, w) has an integer optimal solution x.
In the proof of Theorem 4 we created a stable solution (M ′, p′) from x and (y, d). uunionsq
We finish Section 3.1 by summarizing our main results in the following corollary
(the 1 ⇔ 2 proof follows directly from Theorem 3 (i), whereas 2 ⇔ 3 follows directly
from Theorem 4).
Corollary 2. Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP and (G′, 1, w′) be the instance of
SRP reduced from (G, b, w). The following statements are equivalent:
1. (G, b, w) has a stable solution.
2. (G′, 1, w′) has a stable solution.
3. Primal-(G, b, w) has an integral optimal solution.
3.2 Solving SFP efficiently
We first show how to solve SFP on an instance (G, b, w) by using the results from
Section 3.1. We construct the instance (G′, 1, w′) of SRP. This takes O(n3) time as
we may assume without loss of generality that b(i) ≤ n for all i ∈ N and thus
|N ′| = ∑i∈N b(i) + 4m = O(n2) and |E′| ≤ ∑i∈N b(i)n + 3m ≤ n3 + 3m = O(n3).
We then use the aforementioned algorithm of Biro´ et al. [6] to compute in O(n′m′ +
n′2 log n′) = O(n5) time a stable solution for (G′, 1, w′) or else conclude that (G′, 1, w′)
has no stable solution. In the first case we can modify the stable solution into a stable
solution for (G, b, w) in O(n3) time, as described in the proof of Theorem 4. In the
second case, Theorem 4 tells us that (G, b, w) has no stable solution. The total running
time is O(n5). Below we present an algorithm that solves SFP in O(n2m log(n2/m))
time.
A half-b-matching in a graph G = (N,E) with an integer vertex capacity function
b and an edge weighting w is an edge mapping f that maps each edge e to a value
in {0, 12 , 1}, such that
∑
e:v∈e f(e) ≤ b(v) for each v ∈ N . The weight of f is w(f) =∑
e∈E w(e)f(e).
Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP. We define its duplicated instance (Gˆ, bˆ, wˆ) of
MPA as follows. We replace each player i of G by two players i′ and i′′ in Gˆ with the
same capacities, that is, we set bˆ(i′) = bˆ(i′′) = b(i). Moreover, we replace each edge ij
by two edges i′j′′ and i′′j′ with half-weights, that is, we set wˆ(i′j′′) = wˆ(i′′j′) = 12w(ij).
In a previous paper [6], three of us proved the following statement for instances of
SRP only. We now generalize it for instances of SFP by using similar arguments.
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Theorem 5. An instance (G, b, w) of SFP admits a stable solution if and only if the
maximum weight of a b-matching in G is equal to the maximum weight of a half-b-
matching in G.
Proof. Suppose that (Gˆ, bˆ, wˆ) is the duplicated MPA instance of (G, b, w). From Theo-
rem 2 we know that (Gˆ, bˆ, wˆ) admits a stable solution (Mˆ, pˆ), where Mˆ is a maximum
weight b-matching in Gˆ.
Let xˆ be the characteristic function of Mˆ . Let (yˆ, dˆ) denote a dual optimal solution,
which has the same objective function value as xˆ by Theorem 4. We define a half-b-
matching f for (G, b, w) by setting f(ij) = xˆ(i
′j′′)+xˆ(i′′j′)
2 for each ij ∈ E(G). We
observe that
w(f) =
∑
ij∈E(G)
w(ij)f(ij) =
∑
ij∈E(G)
wˆ(i′j′′)xˆ(i′j′′) + wˆ(i′′j′)xˆ(i′′j′) = wˆ(xˆ).
Therefore f is a feasible solution for Primal-(G, b, w) with the same value as xˆ. We
create a feasible dual solution (y, d) for Dual-(G, b, w) from (yˆ, dˆ) with the same objec-
tive function value, namely wˆ(xˆ), as follows. Let y(i) = yˆ(i′) + yˆ(i′′) for every player
i of G and let d(ij) = dˆ(i′j′′) + dˆ(i′′j′) for every edge ij in E(G). Let us verify that
(y, d) is a feasible dual solution, i.e. that for every edge ij ∈ E(G) we have
y(i) + y(j) + d(ij) = (yˆ(i′) + yˆ(i′′)) + (yˆ(j′) + yˆ(j′′)) + (dˆ(i′j′′) + dˆ(i′′j′))
= (yˆ(i′) + yˆ(j′′) + dˆ(i′j′′)) + (yˆ(i′′) + yˆ(j′) + dˆ(i′′j′))
≥ wˆ(i′j′′) + wˆ(i′′j′)
= w(ij).
Therefore f is a feasible solution for Primal-(G, b, w) and (y, d) is a feasible solution
for Dual-(G, b, w) with the same value, namely wˆ(xˆ), so by the Weak Duality theorem
both f and (y, d) are optimal solutions. Hence we get that f is indeed a maximum
weight half-b-matching with total weight equal to the primal-dual optimum for both
(G, b, w) and (Gˆ, bˆ, wˆ). It is now readily seen that (G, b, w) has a stable solution if and
only if the maximum weight of a b-matching is equal to the maximum weight of a
half-b-matching of (G, b, w). uunionsq
We observe that the maximum weight of a b-matching can be computed in time
O(n2m log(n2/m)), as described in Lemma 2. The maximum weight of a half-b-matching
can be computed in the same time, since the maximum weight of a half-b-matching in
(G, b, w) is the same as the maximum weight of a b-matching in a duplicated bipartite
graph (Gˆ, bˆ, wˆ), as explained in the proof of Theorem 5. This leads to the following
result.
Theorem 6. SFP can be solved in O(n2m log(n2/m)) time.
3.3 Generalizing Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 to SFP
We will now completely generalize Lemma 1 from SRP to SFP. In this way we will
also extend corresponding statements in Theorem 2 from MPA to SFP (see also Sec-
tion 4.1). Note that there exist instances of SRP (for instance, take a triangle) and
thus of SFP with no stable solution. Hence, it is not possible to give a full generaliza-
tion of Theorem 2, as the statement that each instance of MPA has a stable solution
cannot be generalized. For proving our result we need one additional lemma.
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Lemma 6. Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP that has a stable solution (M,p), and
let (G′, 1, w′) be the instance of SRP reduced from (G, b, w). Let (M ′, p′) be a solution
for (G′, 1, w′) reduced from (M,p). Then for every maximum weight b-matching Mˆ
of G, the pair (Mˆ, pˆ), where
– pˆ(i, j) = p′(ij) and pˆ(j, i) = p′(ji) for ij ∈ Mˆ
– pˆ(i, j) = pˆ(j, i) = 0 for ij ∈ E \ Mˆ ,
is a stable solution for (G, b, w). Moreover, pˆ is equivalent to p.
Proof. Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP that has a stable solution (M,p). Let
(G′, 1, w′) be the instance of SRP reduced from (G, b, w). Moreover, let (M ′, p′) be
a solution for (G′, 1, w′) reduced from (M,p). Now let Mˆ be a maximum weight b-
matching of G, and let pˆ be the pay-off vector defined by pˆ(i, j) = p′(ij) and pˆ(j, i) =
p′(ji) for ij ∈ Mˆ and pˆ(i, j) = pˆ(j, i) = 0 for ij ∈ E \Mˆ . We must prove that (Mˆ, pˆ) is
a stable solution for (G, b, w). Consider a matching Mˆ ′ of G′ that is reduced from Mˆ .
By Lemma 4 (i), we find that Mˆ ′ is a maximum weight matching of G′. As (M ′, p′)
is a stable solution of (G′, 1, w′) by Theorem 3 (iii), we may apply Lemma 1 to find
that (Mˆ ′, p′) is a stable solution for (G′, 1, w′) as well (recall that we view p′ as a total
payoff vector defined on N ′). By Theorem 3 (ii) we find that (Mˆ, pˆ) is a stable solution
for (G, b, w). We are left to prove that p and pˆ are equivalent, that is, we show the
following four conditions:
– up(i) = upˆ(i) for every i ∈ N ,
– p(i, j) = pˆ(i, j) and p(j, i) = pˆ(j, i) for every ij ∈M ∩ Mˆ ,
– p(i, j) = up(i) = upˆ(i) and p(j, i) = up(j) = upˆ(j) for every ij ∈M \ Mˆ , and
– pˆ(i, j) = upˆ(i) = up(i) and pˆ(j, i) = upˆ(j) = up(j) for every ij ∈ Mˆ \M .
First suppose that ij ∈ M ∩ Mˆ . Then p(i, j) = p′(ij) = pˆ(i, j). Now suppose that
ij ∈ Mˆ \M . Then ij ∈ E \M . By definition, this means that ijij ∈M ′. As (M ′, p′) is
a solution for (G′, 1, w′), we find that p′(ij) + p′(ij) = w′(ijij). As ij ∈ Mˆ and Mˆ ′ is
reduced from Mˆ , we also find by definition that isij ∈ Mˆ ′ for some s ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)}.
As (Mˆ ′, p′) is a solution for (G′, 1, w′), this means that p′(is) + p′(ij) = w(ij). We
conclude that pˆ(i, j) = p′(ij) = p′(is) = up(i), where the last equality follows from
the definition of p′(is). The same arguments show that for ij ∈ M \ Mˆ we have
p(i, j) = p′(ij) = p′(is) = up(i). Also, for every i ∈ N we deduce that
upˆ(i) = min
ik∈Mˆ
pˆ(i, k)
= min
ik∈Mˆ
p′(ik)
= min
{
min
ik∈Mˆ∩M
p′(ik), min
ik∈Mˆ\M
p′(ik)
}
≥ min{ min
ik∈M
p′(ik), min
ik∈Mˆ\M
p′(ik)
}
= min
{
min
ik∈M
p(i, k), min
ik∈Mˆ\M
p′(ik)
}
= min
{
up(i), min
ik∈Mˆ\M
p′(ik)
}
= min
{
up(i), up(i)
}
= up(i),
where the one-but-last equality uses the fact that p′(ik) = up(i) for every ik ∈ Mˆ \M .
If up(i) = 0, then the facts that p(i, j) = pˆ(i, j) for every ij ∈M∩Mˆ and pˆ(i, j) = up(i)
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for every ij ∈ Mˆ \M imply that up(i) = upˆ(i) = 0. If up(i) > 0, then upˆ(i) ≥ up(i) > 0.
Hence, i is saturated by Mˆ , which implies that up(i) = upˆ(i) as well. Consequently,
for ij ∈ M \ Mˆ we find that p(i, j) = up(i) = upˆ(i). Hence, for all i ∈ N , we find
that up(i) = minj:ij∈E p(i, j) = minj:ij∈E pˆ(i, j) = upˆ(i). We conclude that p and pˆ
are indeed equivalent. This completes the proof of the lemma. uunionsq
We are now ready to present the generalization of Lemma 1 from SRP to SFP and
appropriate parts of Theorem 2 from MPA to SFP.
Theorem 7. Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP. If (M,p) is a stable solution for
(G, b, w) then M is a maximum weight b-matching and pt is a core allocation of the
corresponding multiple partners matching game. Moreover, for every other maximum
weight b-matching Mˆ of G there exists an equivalent payoff vector pˆ of p that is com-
patible with Mˆ .
Proof. The first statement follows immediately from Lemma 3. The second statement
follows immediately from Lemma 6. uunionsq
4 Connecting MPA with SMP
In this section we show how Theorem 3 readily implies the three main results of
Sotomayor for MPA in [44], [45] and [46], respectively. Essentially what we do in each
of our three alternative proofs is reducing MPA to SMP, that is, to the one-to-one case,
which then enables us to apply classical results for SMP. These alternative proofs are
therefore not just simpler than the originals, but also shed light on the connection
between MPA and SMP.
Sotomayor obtained her results for MPA in the context of economic markets. Con-
sider a two-sided market, consisting of two disjoint groups, namely a group I of sellers
and a group J of buyers (I and J are also called the buyer and seller side of the
market, respectively). The set E consists of pairs (i, j) with i ∈ I and j ∈ J that may
go in business with each other. Hence, we can define a bipartite graph G = (I ∪ J,E)
where I and J are the two partition classes. Each seller i ∈ I has b(i) identical objects
(and hence can sell at most b(i) objects). Each buyer j ∈ J may purchase at most
one object from each seller and can buy at most b(j) objects in total. So, the vector b
can be seen as a vertex capacity vector. For each (i, j) ∈ E, we denote the gain of a
transaction between seller i and buyer j by w(ij). This yields an instance (G, b, w) of
MPA.
4.1 The Existence of a Stable Solution
First we provide an alternative proof for Theorem 2, which we restate below.
Theorem 2 ([44]). Every instance (G, b, w) of MPA has a stable solution, which
can be found in polynomial time. If (M,p) is a stable solution then M is a maximum
weight b-matching and pt is a core allocation of the corresponding multiple partners
assignment game. Moreover, for every other maximum weight b-matching Mˆ of G
there exists an equivalent payoff vector pˆ of p that is compatible with Mˆ .
Proof. Combining Theorems 1 and 3 immediately implies the existence of a stable
solution for every instance of MPA. The other parts of the theorem are covered by
Theorem 6 (the polynomial-time result on finding a stable solution) and Theorem 7
(the remaining part). uunionsq
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4.2 The Lattice Structure of Stable Solutions
A complete lattice is a partially ordered set in which every subset has a supremum (ob-
tained via join operations) and an infimum (obtained via meet operations). Sotomayor
[45] proved the following result on the lattice structure of the payoff vectors of stable
solutions of an instance of MPA, for which we give a simple alternative proof. Here, a
stable solution (M,p) of an instance (G, b, w) is optimal for a set S if there is no stable
solution (M ′, p′) with
∑
j:ij∈E p
′(i, j) >
∑
j:ij∈E p(i, j) for some i ∈ S.
Theorem 8 (Sotomayor [45]). The payoff vectors of stable solutions of an instance
of MPA form a complete lattice with unique optimal outcomes for each side of the
market.
Proof. Shapley and Shubik [42] proved that the payoff vectors of stable solutions of
an instance of SMP form a complete lattice with unique optimal outcomes for each
side of the market. They defined the meet and joint operations for two payoff vectors
p and q by setting [p∨ q](i) = min{p(i), q(i)} and [p∧ q](i) = max{p(i), q(i)} for every
i ∈ I, and [p∨ q](j) = max{p(j), q(j)} and [p∧ q](i) = min{p(j), q(j)} for every j ∈ J .
We combine the result of Shapley and Shubik with Theorem 3 after making the
following additional remarks. By Theorem 3 (ii) there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the stable solutions for an instance (G, b, w) of SFP and the payoffs of some of
the players in its reduced instance (G′, 1, w′) of SRP. Namely, a pair (M,p) is a stable
solution for (G, b, w) if and only if there exists a stable solution (M ′, p′) for (G′, 1, w′)
with p′(ij) = p(i, j) and p′(ji) = p(j, i) for every ij ∈M .
We define meet and joint operations for the set of stable payoff vectors for (G, b, w).
Let p and q be two payoff vectors of two stable solutions for (G, b, w) and let p′ and
q′ be the payoff vectors of the reduced stable solutions for (G′, 1, w′), respectively. For
each edge ij ∈M , where i ∈ I and j ∈ J , let
– [p ∨ q](i, j) = min{p(i, j), q(i, j)} = min{p′(ij), q′(ij)} = [p′ ∨ q′](ij),
– [p ∧ q](i, j) = max{p(i, j), q(i, j)} = max{p′(ij), q′(ij)} = [p′ ∧ q′](ij),
– [p ∨ q](j, i) = max{p(j, i), q(j, i)} = max{p′(ji), q′(ji)} = [p′ ∨ q′](ji),
– [p ∧ q](j, i) = min{p(j, i), q(j, i)} = min{p′(ji), q′(ji)} = [p′ ∧ q′](ji).
We need to show that ∨ and ∧ are well defined operators on the set of stable payoff
vectors for (G, b, w). Let us consider operation ∨ (operation ∧ can be treated in the
same way). By Theorem 3 (ii) we can transform p and q to p′ and q′, respectively,
where p′ and q′ are stable payoffs for (G′, 1, w′). Then we create p′∨ q′ as Shapley and
Shubik defined, which is a stable payoff vector for (G′, 1, w′). Finally we construct p∨q
as defined above for (G, b, w). This is a payoff vector of a stable solution for (G, b, w)
by Theorem 3 (ii).
Let S′ ⊂ N ′ be the set of players of form ij and ji in G′. Shapley and Shubik [42]
proved that the payoff vectors of the stable solutions for (G′, 1, w′) form a lattice,
therefore the restrictions of the stable payoff vectors on S′ also form a lattice. This
lattice is equivalent to the lattice of the payoff vectors of the stable solutions for
(G, b, w), as we explained above. This also implies the existence of unique optimal
outcomes for each side of the market for (G, b, w). uunionsq
4.3 Competitive Equilibrium Outcomes
In economic theory, competitive equilibrium outcomes in MPA form a well studied so-
lution concept. For instance they are used in multi-unit auction mechanisms (see, for
example, [36]). Course allocation, where students bid for courses with virtual money, is
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another interesting application; such a system has been recently introduced at Whar-
ton University [10]. In order to explain competitive equilibrium outcomes, we first need
to extend our terminology.
Let (G, b, w) be an instance of MPA. Recall that G = (I∪J,E) is a bipartite graph
with partition classes I (the set of sellers) and J (the set of buyers). Each player i is
endowed with b(i) identical, player-specific goods. Let q(is) denote the price of the sth
item of seller i ∈ I. This yields a price vector q. Recall that every buyer and seller can
only make one transaction of a single item between them and that they may only do
so if they are connected by an edge. For ij ∈ E, the weight w(ij) expresses the mutual
benefit when seller i and buyer j make such a transaction: if j buys the sth item of i
then the payoff for i is p(i, j, s) = q(is) and the payoff for j is p(j, i, s) = w(ij)− q(is).
This leads to a vector p, which is called the payoff vector with respect to q.
For a buyer j ∈ J , a bundle B(j) is a set of items that can be bought by j and
that satisfies the following conditions:
(i) B(j) contains at most one item of every seller;
(ii) B(j) contains at most b(j) items.
For a bundle B(j) and a price vector q, the total payoff for j is the sum of the payoffs
p(j, i, s) over all items in B(j). The demand set Dq(j) of buyer j is the set of all
bundles of B(j) that maximize the total payoff for j over all bundles of j.
Let B = (B(1), . . . , B(|J |)) be a vector, where B(j) is a bundle for buyer j for
j = 1, . . . , |J |, and let q be a price vector. Then (B, q) is called a competitive equilibrium
outcome for (G, b, w) if the following three conditions hold:
(i) for every buyer j ∈ J , B(j) ∈ Dq(j) holds;
(ii) every unsold copy of an item has zero price, that is, q(is) = 0 if the sth item of
buyer i is not in some B(j);
(iii) the sets B(1), . . . , B(|J |) are pairwise disjoint.
Note that this definition implies that for every competitive equilibrium outcome (B, q),
we must have that q(is) = q(it) for every i, s, t, that is, prices of (identical) items of
each seller must be the same: if two items of the same seller would have different prices,
that is, if for some i, j, s, t, q(is) > q(it), then in particular, q(is) > 0, so is must be
sold due to condition (ii). However, if j buys the sth item of i, that is, is ∈ B(j),
then B(j) /∈ Dq(j) violating condition (i). Hence (B, q) would not be a competitive
equilibrium outcome for (G, b, w).
A competitive equilibrium outcome (B, q) for an instance (G, b, w) of MPA is read-
ily seen to correspond to a stable solution (M,p), where p is the payoff vector with
respect to q, where p(i, j) = p(i, k) for every i ∈ I and j, k ∈ J , and p(i, j) = 0 if
i is unsaturated in M . Note that we could have defined the competitive equilibrium
outcomes simply as stable solutions where for every player on one side of the market
her payoffs are identical in every pair she is involved in and equal to zero if she is
unsaturated. However, we decided to deduce this property from the general definition
of competitive equilibrium outcomes, just as Sotomayor did in [46], to explain why
this well-known notion can be characterized by this simple property for MPA.
The main result of Sotomayor [46] is the following theorem, for which we give a
simple alternative proof.
Theorem 9 (Sotomayor [46]). The set of competitive equilibrium outcomes of an
instance of MPA forms a complete lattice with unique optimal outcomes for each side
of the market. The competitive equilibrium outcomes are stable solutions. Moreover, the
buyer-optimal stable solution is equivalent to the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium
outcome.
22
Proof. Again we reduce an instance (G, b, w) of MPA to an instance (G′, 1, w′) of SMP,
as described in Theorem 3. For any stable solution (M,p) of (G, b, w) let (M ′, p′) be
the reduced stable solution for (G′, 1, w′). Now we can create another stable solution
(M ′, pˆ′) for (G′, 1, w′), where for every ij ∈ M we set pˆ′(ij) = up(i) ≤ p′(ij) = p(i, j)
and pˆ′(ji) = wij − up(i) ≥ p(j, i) and keep the other payoffs the same. Since we only
modified the redistribution between ij and ji (that is, ji is now getting all the potential
surplus in this pair), the only potential blocking pair for pˆ′ is the pair {ij , ij}. However,
this pair cannot be blocking since pˆ′(ij) = p′(ij) = wij−up(i), so pˆ′(ij)+pˆ′(ij) = w(ij).
Let (M, pˆ) be the solution for (G, b, w) from which (M ′, pˆ′) is reduced. Here, every
seller i receives identical payoffs from each of her buyers, that is, for every ij ∈ M
we have pˆ(i, j) = up(i). Therefore this solution is a competitive equilibrium outcome
(M, q), where the price of the items of each seller i is q(i) = up(i) (and the corre-
sponding bundles B(j) are given by the items matched to j in M). Moreover, the
price vectors of the set of competitive equilibrium outcomes form a lattice, which is a
sublattice of the lattice of the payoff vectors of the stable solutions. This is because
the meet and joint operations (as defined in the proof of Theorem 8) result in price
vectors of competitive equilibrium outcomes when applied to price vectors of compet-
itive equilibrium outcomes (indeed, if all copies of an item have identical prices with
respect to two given stable payoffs p and pˆ, then this also holds for their meet and
join).
Finally, we show that the buyer-optimal stable solution is equivalent to the buyer-
optimal competitive equilibrium outcome. Let (M,p) be a buyer-optimal solution
(where p is uniquely determined). The above construction yields, via p′ and pˆ, a
stable solution (M, pˆ), which is a competitive equilibrium. By construction, we have
pˆ′(i, j) = up(i) ≤ p(i, j). However, since p was buyer optimal, a strict inequality is
impossible. Hence pˆ = p must hold. uunionsq
5 Core Properties
To get started we recall that the core of a multiple partners matching game may be
empty, as we could take for instance a triangle on three vertices and set b ≡ 1 and
w ≡ 1. Below we show that this may also be the case for b 6= 1 by presenting the
following example, which shows that the core of a multiple partners matching game
may be empty even if b ≡ α for an arbitrary constant α ≥ 2.
Example 4. Let α ≥ 2. We start by taking a cycle on three vertices s1, s2 and s3. For i =
1, . . . , 3, we add α−1 pendant (degree 1) vertices t1i , . . . , tαi −1 to si; see also Figure 3.
We set b ≡ α and w ≡ 1. Then v(N) = 3(α−1)+1 = 3α−2. We may assume without
loss of generality that p(tji ) = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, . . . , α−1. Then, by symmetry,
p(si) = α − 23 for i = 1, 2, 3. Take the coalition S = {s1, s2, t11, . . . , tα−11 , t12, . . . , tα−12 }.
It holds that p(S) = 2α− 43 < 2α− 1 = v(S) and thus the core of this game is empty.
To increase our insight into the core of a multiple partners matching game, we now
show that every core allocation x of a multiple partners matchings game equals the
total payoff vector pt of a suitable payoff vector p, which we can find in polynomial
time. More precisely, we may even fix an arbitrary maximum weight b-matching M∗ to
obtain suitable payoffs p(i, j) from the edges of M∗. For proving this, we first present a
small lemma which basically states that a corresponding system of equations (without
any non-negativity constraints) is solvable. For a matching M of a graph G = (N,E),
we let N(M) denote the subset of vertices of G incident with at least one edge of M .
Lemma 7. Let (N, v) be a multiple partners matching game on some triple (G, b, w).
Let M∗ be a maximum weight b-matching of G, and let x ∈ RN be a vector satisfying
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Fig. 3. The graph from Example 4 for α = 5.
x(N(M∗k )) = w(M
∗
k )) for every connected component M
∗
k of M
∗. Then it is possible
to find in polynomial time a vector p with (not necessarily positive) entries p(i, j) such
that
p(i, j) + p(j, i) = w(ij) for all ij ∈M∗
p(i, j) = p(j, i) = 0 for all ij ∈ E\M∗
pt(i) :=
∑
j:ij∈E p(i, j) = x(i) for all i ∈ N.
Proof. Suppose M∗ contains a cycle C. We do as follows. We pick an edge ij ∈ C
and define p(i, j) = p(j, i) = 12w(ij). Then we decrease x(i) and x(j) by the same
amount 12w(ij). We remove the edge ij and decrease b(i) and b(j) by one each. In this
way, M∗\{ij} is a maximum weight matching of the reduced instance. We repeat this
operation on another cycle that contains only edges of M∗\{ij} until such cycles no
longer exist. As each time we apply the operation we reduce M∗ by at least one edge,
this procedure terminates in polynomial time.
From the above we may assume that M∗ induces a forest. If M∗ induces a tree, we
do as follows. Fix a leaf i of the forest and let i ∈ N(M∗) be matched by ij ∈M∗. Set
p(i, j) := x(i) and p(j, i) := w(ij)− x(i). We set x(j) := x(j)− p(j, i) = x(j) + x(i)−
w(ij) and perform the same operation on a leaf of M∗ \ {ij} until M∗ has no more
edges. If M∗ induces a forest, we consider each connected component of M separately.
Each time we apply the operation we reduce M∗ by at least one edge. Hence this
procedure, and thus our whole algorithm, runs in polynomial time. uunionsq
Our first theorem in this section can be obtained by applying Lemma 7 to core
allocations x.
Theorem 10. Let (N, v) be a multiple partners matching game on some triple (G, b, w).
For every maximum weight b-matching M∗ of G and every core allocation x of (N, v),
we can find in polynomial time a payoff vector p compatible with M∗, such that x = pt.
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Proof. The core constraints ensure that x satisfies the requirements x(N(M∗k )) =
w(M∗k ) for every component M
∗
k of M
∗. Hence we may apply Lemma 7 to obtain in
polynomial time a vector p with (not necessarily positive) entries p(i, j) such that
p(i, j) + p(j, i) = w(ij) for all ij ∈M∗
p(i, j) = p(j, i) = 0 for all ij ∈ E\M∗
pt(i) :=
∑
j:ij∈E p(i, j) = x(i) for all i ∈ N.
If p ≥ 0 then we are done. Suppose not. Pick an arbitrary edge ij ∈M∗ with p(i, j) < 0.
Let
A := {ij | ij ∈M∗ and p(j, i) > 0}.
Note that ij ∈ A, since p(j, i) = w(ij)−p(i, j) > w(ij) ≥ 0. We claim that there exists
a directed path of arcs in A that starts in j and that ends in i. For contradiction,
suppose that such a directed path does not exist. Let S ⊆ N denote the set of vertices
that can be reached from j along arcs in A. Thus i /∈ S, j ∈ S, and p(k, `) ≤ 0 for
all k /∈ S, ` ∈ S. Note that for k = i and ` = j we get a strict inequality. Hence, for
S¯ := N\S we conclude that
x(S¯) =
∑
k/∈S x(k)
=
∑
k/∈S
∑
`:k`∈E p(k, `)
=
∑
k/∈S(
∑
`∈S:k`∈E p(k, `) +
∑
`/∈S:k`∈E p(k, `))
<
∑
k/∈S
∑
`/∈S:k`∈E p(k, `)
= w(M ∗¯
S
),
where M ∗¯
S
is the restriction of M∗ to edges with both end-vertices in S¯ (recall that
p(i, j) = p(j, i) = 0 if ij ∈ E \M∗). This strict inequality contradicts our assumption
that x is a core allocation of G.
Due to the above claim we can find (in polynomial time) a directed path P of
arcs in A that starts in j and that ends in i. Together with arc ij ∈ A this gives us a
directed cycle C ⊆ A such that for each arc ij ∈ C we can increase p(i, j) and decrease
p(j, i) by  = minij∈C p(j, i) > 0. This reduces the minimal total amount of negative
payoffs of p. We repeat this operation until p ≥ 0. Each time we do this, we reduce at
least one payoff p(j, i) to zero. Hence, our algorithm runs in polynomial time. uunionsq
Theorem 7 tells us that if (M,p) is a stable solution for an instance (G, b, w) of
SFP, then pt is a core allocation of the corresponding multiple partners matching
game. This is in line with corresponding results for the other models and thus shows
that the notion of stability is well defined with respect to the core definition. However,
Theorem 10 seems to suggest that core allocations may also correspond to solutions
that are not stable. Indeed the following result shows that this may be the case even
if the corresponding instance of SFP has no stable solutions.
Theorem 11. There exist multiple partners matching games with a non-empty core
but for which the corresponding instance of SFP has no stable solutions.
Proof. Consider the following example. Take a diamond, that is, a cycle on three
vertices s1, s2, s3 to which we add a fourth vertex u with edges s2u and s3u. We set
b(si) = 2 for i = 1, 2, 3 and b(u) = 1, and w ≡ 1. Then Theorem 5 tells us that a stable
solution does not exist, since the maximum weight of a b-matching is 3, whilst the
maximum weight of a half-b-matching is 3 12 (for the latter, take f(s1s2) = f(s1s3) = 1
and f(s2s3) = f(s2u) = f(s3u) =
1
2 ). However, the total payoff vector p
t defined by
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pt(si) = 1 for i = 1, . . . , 3 and p
t(u) = 0, which corresponds to, say, the b-matching
M = {s1s2, s1s3, s2s3} with payoffs p(s1, s2) = 1, p(s2, s3) = 1 and p(s3, s1) = 1 and
zero payoffs for the other edges is in the core. uunionsq
Due to Theorem 11, the analysis of the core cannot be reduced to the the case
in which we have unit vertex capacities (in contrast to our results in Section 3). We
distinguish between the cases b ≤ 2 (which includes the known case of matching games,
where b = 1) and and b = 3.
5.1 The Case b ≤ 2
We analyze the case b(i) ≤ 2 for i = 1, ..., n as follows. Note that a player i with
b(i) = 0 necessarily gets 0 payoff in any core allocation, so the problem reduces trivially
to G[N\{i}]. For this reason we assume b(i) ≥ 1 for all i ∈ N in the following. For
b ≤ 2 we can provide a positive answer to problem P3, which implies that testing
core membership can be done in polynomial time. Recall that a positive answer to P3
implies the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm that either finds that the core is
empty, or else obtains a core allocation. As mentioned in Section 1, our algorithm uses
an algorithm that solves the tramp steamer problem (which we formally define below)
as a subproblem.
Let G = (N,E) be a graph with an edge weighting p : E → R+ called the profit
function and an edge weighting w : E → R+ called the cost function. Let C = (NC , EC)
be a cycle of G. The profit-to-cost ratio for a cycle C is p(C)w(C) where we write p(C) =
p(EC) and w(C) = w(EC). The tramp steamer problem is that of finding a cycle C
with maximum profit-to-cost ratio. This problem is well-known to be polynomial-time
solvable both for directed and undirected graphs (see [30], or [35] for a treatment of
more general “fractional optimization” problems).
Lemma 8. The tramp steamer problem can be solved in polynomial time.
We are now ready to prove the following result.
Theorem 12. The problem of deciding whether an allocation p is in the core of a
multiple partners matching game can be solved in polynomial time if b ≤ 2. Moreover,
if p is not in the core, then a coalition S with p(S) < v(S) can be found in polynomial
time as well.
Proof. Let (N, v) be a multiple partners matching game defined on a triple (G, b, w),
where b(i) ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N . Given S ⊆ N , a maximum weight b-matching in G[S] is
composed of cycles and paths. Hence the core can be alternatively described by the
following (slightly smaller) set of constraints:
p(C) ≥ w(C), for all cycles C ∈ C
p(P ) ≥ w(P ), for all paths P ∈ P
p(N) = v(N).
(4)
Here, C stands for the set of cycles C ⊆ E in G with b(i) = 2 for all i ∈ V (C).
Similarly, P stands for the set of paths P with b(i) = 2 for all inner points on P .
Given p ∈ RN , we can check in polynomial time whether p(N) = v(N) holds by
computing a maximum weight b-matching in G, which can be done in polynomial time
by Lemma 2. Thus we are left with the inequalities for cycles and paths in (4).
We deal with the cycles first. Let N2 := {i ∈ N : b(i) = 2} and G2 := G[N2].
In the induced graph G2 = (N2, E2), we “discharge” the given allocations p(i) to the
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edges by setting p(i, j) := (p(i) + p(j))/2 for every edge ij in G2. This defines an edge
weighting p : E2 → R such that the core constraints for cycles are equivalent to
max
C∈C
w(C)
p(C)
≤ 1,
where the maximum is taken over all cycles in G2. Hence we obtained an instance of
the tramp steamer problem, which is polynomial-time solvable by Lemma 8. Note that
by solving the above minimization problem we either find that all cycle constraints in
(4) are satisfied or we end up with a particular cycle C corresponding to a violated core
inequality. (The latter is of particular importance if we intend to use the “membership
oracle” as a subroutine for the ellipsoid method.)
In what follows, we thus assume that all cycle constraints in (4) are satisfied by the
given vector p ∈ RN and turn to the path constraints. We process these separately for
all possible endpoints i0, j0 ∈ N (with i0 6= j0) and all possible lengths k = 1, ..., n−1.
Let Pk(i0, j0) ⊆ P denote the set of i0 − j0-paths of length k in G. We construct a
corresponding auxiliary graph Gk(i0, j0), a subgraph of G × Pk+1, the product of G
with a path of length k. To this end, let N
(1)
2 , ..., N
(k−1)
2 be k − 1 copies of N2. The
vertex set of Gk(i0, j0) is then {i0, j0} ∪ N (1)1 ∪ ... ∪ N (k−1)2 . We denote the copy of
i ∈ N2 in N (r)2 by i(r). The edges of Gk(i0, j0) and their weights w¯ can then be defined
as
0j
(1) for i0j ∈ E with weight w¯(i0j) := p(i0) + p(j)/2− w(i0j)
i(r−1)j(r) for ij ∈ E with weight w¯(ij) := (p(i) + p(j))/2− w(ij)
i(k−1)j0 for ij0 ∈ E with weight w¯(ij0) := p(i)/2 + p(j0)− w(ij0).
We claim that p(P ) ≥ w(P ) holds for all P ∈ P if and only if the (w.r.t. w¯) shortest
i0 − j0–path in Gk(i0, j0) has weight ≥ 0 for all i0 6= j0 and k = 1, .., n − 1. Then
what is left to do, in order to verify whether p(P ) ≥ w(P ) holds for all P ∈ P, is to
solve O(n3) instances of the shortest path problem, each of which have size O(n2) by
using the well-known Bellman-Ford algorithm [4]; as we show below, if this yields a
shortest path with weight < 0 we have immediately found a coalition corresponding
to a violated core inequality,
First suppose some P ∈ P has p(P ) < w(P ). Let i0 and j0 denote its endpoints
and let k denote its length. Then P ∈ Pk(i0, j0) corresponds to an i0 − j0-path P¯ in
Gk(i0, j0) of weight w¯(P¯ ) < 0. Now we will show that p(P ) ≥ w(P ) for all P ∈ P
implies w¯(P¯ ) ≥ 0 for all i0 − j0-paths P¯ in any Gk(i0, j0). Indeed, an i0 − j0-path P¯
visiting players i0, i
(1)
1 , ..., i
(k−1)
k−1 , j0 corresponds to a i0 − j0 path P ⊆ E in G plus
possibly a number of cycles C1, ..., Cs ⊆ E. Furthermore, by definition of w¯, we have
w¯(P¯ ) = p(P )− w(P ) +∑i p(Ci)− w(Ci) ≥ p(P )− w(P ), as we assume that p(C) ≥
w(C) holds for all cycles. Hence, indeed, w¯(P¯ ) ≥ 0, as claimed. uunionsq
5.2 The Case b = 3
To complement Theorem 12 we will prove that the case b ≡ 3 is co-NP-complete even
for multiple partners assignment games. In order to do this we reduce from the Cubic
Subgraph problem, which is that of testing whether a graph has a 3-regular subgraph,
that is, a subgraph in which every vertex has degree 3. Plesn´ık [38] proved that Cubic
Subgraph is NP-complete even for planar bipartite graphs of maximum degree 4.
Theorem 13. The problem of deciding whether an allocation is in the core of a mul-
tiple partners assignment game is co-NP-complete if b ≡ 3 and w ≡ 1.
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Proof. The problem is readily seen to be in co-NP: given a “certificate” coalition S
we can efficiently verify that a given allocation p is not in the core by checking that
v(S) > p(S) holds; the latter can be done in polynomial time due to Lemma 2. To
prove co-NP-hardness we reduce from the Cubic Subgraph problem restricted to
bipartite graphs. Recall that this problem is NP-complete [38].
Let G = (N,E) be a bipartite graph that is an instance of Cubic Subgraph. Let
n = |N |. For each vertex u ∈ N we add a set of five new vertices au, bu, cu, xu, yu,
so in total we add 5n extra vertices to G. We also add every edge between a vertex
in {au, bu, cu} and a vertex in {u, xu, yu}, so in total we add 9n extra edges to G. We
call the resulting graph G∗ = (N∗, E∗) (see also Figure 4). Note that each 6-tuple
{au, bu, cu, u, xu, yu} induces a complete bipartite graph K3,3 in G∗ (and that u is a
cut vertex of G∗ that separates {au, bu, cu, xu, yu} and N \ {u}). Moreover, G∗ is a
bipartite graph as desired.
ua
u
cu
bu yu
xu
Fig. 4. An example of the graph G∗ constructed in the proof of Theorem 13.
Let (N∗, v) be the multiple partners assignment game defined on (G∗, 3, 1), and
let p be the vector, where we set, for every u ∈ U , p(u) = 32 − 1n and p(i) = 32 + 15n
for every i ∈ {au, bu, cu, xu, yu}. Then p is an allocation, as v(N∗) = 9n = p(N∗),
where the first equality follows by taking a b-matching that consists of all nine edges
in G[{au, bu, cu, u, xu, yu}] (so, 9n edges in total). We are left to prove that G has a
cubic subgraph if and only if p does not belong to the core of (N∗, v).
First suppose that G has a 3-regular subgraph H = (NH , EH). Then the coalition
NH ⊆ N∗ will not be satisfied: indeed, v(NH) = 32 |NH | > 32 |NH | − 1n |NH | = p(NH),
so p does not belong to the core of (N∗, v).
Now suppose that G has no 3-regular subgraph. For contradiction, assume there
exists a coalition S ⊆ N∗, such that p(S) < v(S). We choose S such that p(S)− v(S)
is minimum, and moreover, we assume that S is a coalition of smallest size over all
such coalitions.
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First consider the case that S only contains vertices of N . Then, as G has no
3-regular subgraph, neither does G[S], implying that v(S) ≤ 32 |S| − 1. We use this
inequality to find that p(S) = 32 |S| − 1n |S| ≥ 32 |S| − 1 ≥ v(S), a contradiction with
our assumption that p(S) < v(S). Hence S contains at least one vertex from a set
{au, bu, cu, xu, yu} for some u ∈ N . Let Tu = S∩{au, bu, cu, xu, yu}, so we assume that
|Tu| ≥ 1. If |Tu| ≤ 4, then
p(S \Tu)−v(S \Tu) ≤ p(S)−v(S)−|Tu|
(
3
2
+
1
5n
)
+ |E(G[Tu∪{u}])| ≤ p(S)−v(S),
contradicting our choice of S. Now suppose that |Tu| = 5. If u /∈ S, then
p(S \ Tu)− v(S \ Tu) ≤ p(S)− v(S)− 5
(
3
2
+
1
5n
)
+ 6 ≤ p(S)− v(S),
contradiction our choice of S again. If u ∈ S, then
p(S \ (Tu ∪ {u}))− v(S \ (Tu ∪ {u})) ≤ p(S)− v(S)− 5
(
3
2
+
1
5n
)
−
(
3
2
− 1
n
)
+ 9
≤ p(S)− v(S),
another contradiction with our choice of S. Hence we conclude that a coalition S with
p(S) < v(S) does not exist. In other words, p belongs to the core of (N∗, v). This
completes the proof of Theorem 13. uunionsq
6 Future Work
We finish our paper with some directions for future research. Our reduction from SFP
to SRP might be used to generalize more known results from SRP to SFP. For instance,
can we generalize the path to stability result of Biro´ et al. [5] for SRP to be valid for
SFP as well?
P1 P2 P3
assignment games yes P P
matching games P P P
mp assignment games yes P P if b ≤ 2
NP-c if b ≡ 3
mp matching games P if b ≤ 2 P if b ≤ 2 P if b ≤ 2
? if b ≡ 3 ? if b ≡ 3 NP-c if b ≡ 3
Table 2. The four cooperative game models and their status with respect to problems P1
(testing core non-emptiness), P2 (finding a core allocation) and P3 (verifying core mem-
bership). Here “yes” means that every instance of the problem under consideration is a
yes-instance, whereas “P” smeans polynomial time and“ NP-c” means being NP-complete.
As before,“mp” stands for “multiple partners”. Note that the rows for assignment games and
matching games were known already (see Section 1) but can be generated from the rows for
the other two models. Also the first two entries in the row for multiple partners assignment
games were known already (Theorem 2). Except the two open cases indicated by a “?”, all
other results follow from Theorems 12 and 13, which are proven in this paper.
In contrast to multiple partners assignment games, we do not know the complexity
of testing core non-emptiness (problem P1) and finding a core allocation (problem P2)
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for multiple partners matching games (G, b, w) when b ≡ 3. We pose these two problems
as open problems (see also Table 2). As we showed in Theorem 12 we can decide in
polynomial-time whether the core of a multiple partners matching is nonempty if b ≤ 2.
This immediately raises the question what to do if we find that the core is non-empty.
One approach, which was recently considered for the case b ≡ 1, is that of verifying
whether the core can become nonempty after a small modification of the graph via
adding or deleting some vertices or edges [1, 8, 26] or via a fractionally increase of the
edge weights [13].
Theorem 11 states that there exist multiple partners matching games with a non-
empty core but for which the corresponding instance of SFP has no stable solutions. It
would be interesting to detect necessary and sufficient conditions on multiple partners
matching games with a non-empty core, such that the corresponding instance of SFP
has a stable solution. Another direction is to consider whether it is possible to obtain
axiomatic characterizations of the core of multiple partners assignment games, or even
for (multiple partners) matching games, similar to those that exist in the literature
for assignment games (see, for instance, [41, 47]).
Another major open problem is that of determining the complexity of computing
the so-called nucleolus of a matching game (N, v). So far only partial results have
been obtained in this direction, namely polynomial-time algorithms for assignment
games [43] and for matching games with unit edge weights [27] or, more generally,
with edge weights that can be expressed as the sum of positive weights on the incident
vertices of the graph G = (N,E) [37], or even more generally, with arbitrary edge
weights as long as a certain condition on the least core of a subgraph (with vertex
weights) of G is satisfied [18]. Can these results be generalized for b ≤ 2?
Aziz and de Keijzer [2] showed that the Shapley value of a matching game can be
computed in polynomial time for graphs of maximum degree 2, and for graphs that
have a small modular decomposition into cliques or cocliques. Recently, Bousquet [9]
extended these results by proving that the Shapley value of a matching game can be
computed in polynomial time for trees. Hence, another research direction would be to
consider the Shapley value for multiple partners matching games restricted to trees,
or even to trees of small maximum degree.
Chalkiadakis et al. [12] defined cooperative games with overlapping coalitions,
where players can be involved in coalitions with different intensities, leading to three
alternative core definitions. It would be interesting to study the problem of finding
a stable solutions and problems P1–P3 in these settings. To illustrate this, suppose
that the set of soccer teams from the example at the start of Section 1 consists of
international teams. Then it seems realistic that the home team needs to spend fewer
days for playing the game than the visiting team, which must travel from another
country. Hence, every team now has a number of days for playing friendly games in-
stead of an upper limit (target) on the number of such games. As another example
of two-player coalitions that require different intensities, consider a PhD student, who
can be expected to spend significantly more time per week on her PhD project per
than her supervisor.
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